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LOUISIANA PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AFTER WEDE
V. NICHE MARKETING
Joseph Stanier Manning *
Louisiana’s approach to public records doctrine is muddy and
largely the result of historical accident; the Louisiana State Law
Institute and Louisiana legislature have amended the civil code
intending to reform this body of law, but the courts have not
recognized this reform and interpret the new codal text in ways
that yield no new substantive change in the law. Beginning in
1992, the Louisiana legislature revised the Civil Code, which
created Titles 22 and 22-A. Some commentators interpreted these
revisions as an attempt to change the law of recordation
completely. In 2010, the Wede v. Niche Marketing case made its
way to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the case was decided in
such a way that the apparent changes in the law made by the
revisions were given no effect. 1 Wede tells us that the law of public
records doctrine has not changed since the addition of Titles 22
and 22-A, but the case also illustrates the problems that arise by
keeping two separate sets of land records – one for mortgages and
one for conveyances. If this arbitrary distinction were removed, it
is likely that the Wede case would have been decided in a way that
would have given effect to the apparent changes in the revisions.

* Candidate, Juris Doctor and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law,
LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center (2013); B.A. (hons.), Paul Tulane College,
Tulane University (2008). I send many thanks and much gratitude to the
following people for their support and helpful comments: Professor Olivier
Moréteau, Professor Randy Trahan, Jennifer Lane, and my wife, Annabelle
Pardi Manning.
1. Wede v. Niche Mktg. USA, LLC, No. 51406, 2008 WL 5770634 (La.
Dist. Ct. November 25, 2008), rev’d, 09-146 (La. App. 5. Cir. 12/29/09); 30 So.
3d 145, aff’d, 2010-0243 (La. 11/30/10); 52 So. 3d 60 (2010).
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I. BACKGROUND
In Wede, a money judgment was filed in the parish records to
create a judicial mortgage on all immovables that the defendantdebtor owned in that parish. Because the Clerk of Court’s office no
longer kept physical records, the judgment was scanned
electronically. When the document was scanned, the Deputy Clerk
handling the document, instead of electronically marking it “MO”
for mortgage documents, electronically marked it “CO” for
conveyance documents. Because of this mistake, the judgment
would not show up in any mortgage searches made by means of
the computer system.
Before the Clerk’s Office realized and corrected its mistake,
the debtor sold some of his encumbered immovable property. The
judgment creditor then moved to seize that property from the thirdparties who had bought it, insisting that its judicial mortgage was
in evidence in the parish records when the sale took place despite
the Deputy Clerk’s computer errors.
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The district court, applying Louisiana Civil Code article 3347
ruled for the judgment creditor. 2 The article states in full:
The effect of recordation arises when an instrument is filed
with the recorder and is unaffected by subsequent errors or
omissions of the recorder. An instrument is filed with a
recorder when he accepts it for recordation in his office. 3
The court found the mistake to be one of misindexing on the
part of the Clerk's office rather than one of misrecording. Though
the court acknowledged that third-parties should be able to rely on
the public records, the court also pointed out that the indices are
not part of the public records. To the trial court, this meant the

2. Id.
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3347 (2012).
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recording was valid and that the clerk's mistake did not have any
adverse effect on the judicial mortgage.
The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court both
disagreed with the district court that this was an indexing error.
The Louisiana Supreme Court echoed the circuit court’s reasoning
by reading Civil Code article 3347 alongside Civil Code article
3338. 4 The Supreme Court held that, while article 3347 describes
“when” a document must be recorded, it is article 3338 that
addresses “where” a document must be recorded. 5 The Supreme
Court held that because the document was listed as "CO" rather
than "MO," it had been filed in the conveyance records rather than
the mortgage records. And because it was filed in the wrong set of
records, it was not properly recorded and did not affect thirdparties.
III. COMMENTARY
Among the jurisdictions within the United States, there is a
majority and a minority approach regarding how to deal with
public records. “The majority view is that a person who files a
document . . . is protected if the instrument is delivered to the
proper recording official. . . .” 6 Under this approach the filer is
legally protected despite any recording errors later – even if the
instrument is never actually recorded at all. 7 On the other hand, the
minority jurisdictions hold an instrument must be recorded to be
effective. 8 Louisiana has historically fallen within the minority
camp, and this case further cements Louisiana’s position among
those jurisdictions.

4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3338 (2012).
5. Wede, 52 So. 3d 60, n.9 at 65.
6. ALEJANDRO M. GARRO, LOUISIANA PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AND
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 218–219 (Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications
Institute, Baton Rouge, 1989).
7. Id. at 219.
8. Id.
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For most of Louisiana legal history, the Louisiana law of
recordation has lacked “a unified and coherent legislative
framework.” 9 Indeed, “the statutory provisions specifying . . .
when the act of recordation was deemed to be complete
contradicted one another.” 10 This unruly approach came about
largely through accident. 11 “Louisiana law historically has always
distinguished between filing and recordation.” 12 It also
distinguished and treated separately “the recordation of mortgages
and that of conveyances.” 13 For example, “[c]onveyances were
always deemed effective upon filing, even if not recorded, while
mortgages were effective only upon recordation.” 14 Also, rather
than recording all land documents together like most jurisdictions,
Louisiana record offices keep a distinct set of records for
conveyances and a distinct set of records for mortgages. 15
Over the past century the legislature made several attempts to
remedy these discrepancies. 16 For example, Act 215 of 1910,
codified as Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5141, was passed to make
mortgages effective against third-parties at the time of filing. 17
This would have brought the way mortgages were deemed to be
effective into line with the way conveyances were treated. Even so,
this legislative intent was “not recognized by the jurisprudence.” 18

9. Id. at 246.
10. Id. at 247.
11. Id.
12. Michael H. Rubin & Stephen P. Strohchein, Security Devices, 55 LA. L.
REV. 611, 615 (1995).
13. GARRO, supra note 6, at 245.
14. Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 615.
15. The Wede case is rooted in the fact that these distinct sets of records are
kept. Although the judgment-creditor’s mortgage did indeed get recorded, the
problem was that it was incorrectly recorded in an arbitrarily defined set of land
records. If nothing else, this case illustrates the folly of keeping separate records
for conveyances and mortgages for no reason other than historical accident.
16. GARRO, supra note 6, at 276–282 (discussing a thoroughly researched
history of these attempts as well as the various outcomes of each attempt).
17. Michael H. Rubin & R. Marshall Grodner, Security Devices, 53 LA. L.
REV. 969, 1002 (1993); Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 615; GARRO,
supra note 6, at 279.
18. Id., Rubin & Grodner at 1002.
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Instead of ruling that mortgages become effective immediately
upon filing, the courts made mortgage instruments effective
retroactive to the time of filing only if they were actually placed in
the records within a reasonable time after the filing. 19
This was the state of the law until 1992 when the Louisiana
State Law Institute, recognizing the law’s haphazard approach to
registry, decided to fully systematize and integrate the public
records law. This systemization was put into effect by the
Louisiana Legislature through Act 652 of 1991 and Act 169 of
2005, which gave rise to Title 22 and Title 22-A respectively, in
Book III of the Civil Code. Notably, one of the amendments to the
Civil Code that came about through these revisions was article
3347. A plain reading suggested that in all instances a record
would become effective against third parties at the time of filing
without regard to later errors. 20 For these reasons, this article at
first glance appeared to rewrite the recordation law so that
Louisiana would join the majority view described above.
While the earlier rule, as noted above, was that an instrument’s
effectiveness arose retroactive to filing provided that actual
recordation later occurred, this new provision’s language seemed
to put forward rather plainly that any “effect” that comes from
“recordation” arises when an instrument is “filed,” without regard
to any later errors on the part of the recorder. The new article goes
on to specify that an instrument is “filed” when the instrument is
accepted by the recorder.
Of the three courts that rendered judgment in the Wede case
only one – the trial court – adopted this “plain meaning” reading of
the article. The Louisiana Supreme Court, by contrast, specifically
19. Id.; GARRO, supra note 6, at 280 (explaining the now irrelevant
constitutional reasons behind this rule); Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at
615 (citing Kennibrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 154 So. 2d 433 (La. 1963) and
Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770 (La. App. 1929)).
20. Generally this is the tentative rule that was being taught to students by
Louisiana law professors since the legislation was passed and at least up until
the Wede court delivered this decision.
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rejected this reading. According to that court, article 3347, rather
than answering the question “what must be done in the way of
filing and recordation” in its entirety, answers only the “when” part
of the question. Alongside this part of the question, the court
reasoned, there is also a “where” part. According to the court, the
“where” part of the question is answered in article 3338. So, under
article 3347 “recordation” occurs when an instrument is “filed,”
but according to the Louisiana Supreme Court interpretation of
article 3338 any recordation is “without effect . . . unless the
instrument is registered by recording it in the appropriate mortgage
or conveyance records.”
But what effect, if any, did the Supreme Court give to the
language of article 3347 stating that a recording’s effectiveness is
“unaffected by subsequent errors or omissions of the recorder?” In
a footnote, the court explained that it was unnecessary to describe
“what might be included within the complete spectrum” of that
phrase. 21 The court did, however, declare that the error of “placing
an instrument outside of the mortgage records and into the
conveyance records” could not be the kind of error contemplated,
because otherwise the article would conflict with article 3338.22
Justifying this interpretation, the court referred to its
jurisprudential rule not to interpret statutes as in conflict with one
another but rather to reconcile perceived inconsistencies.
Since the revisions to the Civil Code adding Titles 22 and
22-A, Wede has been the only case decided that tells us whether
there was effective legislative reform in this area of law. From
Wede we learn that the change in the Louisiana public records
from the minority view to the majority view that some observers
believed had been accomplished by legislative revision was
illusory. It remains the case that in Louisiana a mortgage
instrument must be actually placed in the correct set of records –
the mortgage records – to be considered “recorded.” Only then is
21. Wede, 52 So. 3d, n.10 at 65.
22. Id.
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this recordation effective against third parties (albeit retroactively
to the original time of filing). This is the same law as Louisiana
had before 1992. In this regard, Wede informs us that no change
has taken place in this crucial element of the Louisiana public
records doctrine. The Louisiana Supreme Court reached its result
by focusing intently on “where” land records are filed – with the
mortgages or conveyances. Louisiana does not need to maintain
two separate sets of records. Removing this arbitrary distinction
between mortgage records and conveyance records will go a long
way toward improving Louisiana public records doctrine.

